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Ambition Meets Opportunity
Can I really afford to raise tuition above infla-
tion? If so, I can afford this program. You
quickly persuade yourself you ought to have
the program. We prospered as an institution
by following that strategy, but the world has
changed and we can't do that any more.
James N. Rosse, 1990'
IN HIS 1978 report, Planning for the Eighties, Duke Chancellor Ken-
neth Pye spoke for many in higher education when he wrote that the
coming decade would require stringency and selective retrenchment.
Chancellor Pye called for a 15 percent reduction in the size of the
faculty through selective elimination of programs. Although he did
in fact bring about a few cutbacks, the decade of the 1980s, both at
Duke and at other private research universities, was anything but
austere. Buoyed by tuition increases that outpaced inflation by an
average of four percentage points per year, the country's top private
universities experienced a decade of steadily increasing expendi-
tures. The example of Duke is especially striking: rather than
shrinking, its arts and sciences faculty grew by 14 percent in the
decade beginning with the 1981/82 academic year.
2 The preceding
chapters have examined this period of rising outlays by focusing on
four institutions. In this final chapter, the study's approach and
principal findings are reviewed, and the causes of these increases are
suggested. The chapter's last section discusses three issues arising
from the study that have implications for future directions in higher
education.
THE STUDY AND ITS LIMITATIONS
For its empirical findings, the present study relies principally on in-
formation covering the period beginning with the 1976/77 academic
year and ending with the 1991/92 year for three private research
universities—the University of Chicago, Duke University, and Har-248 AMBITION MEETS OPPORTUNITY
vard University—and one private liberal arts college—Carleton Col-
lege. Owing to the small size of this sample, it is obviously impossible
to make any claims of statistical representativeness. Nor can it be
said that the group of institutions to which these four belong is rep-
resentative of American higher education in general. One reason for
eschewing the advantages of a large and representative sample is the
prospect of learning new things from the deeper level of detail made
possible by restricting the number of institutions. Moreover, al-
though the findings are not necessarily applicable to the rest of
American higher education, these institutions do stand as nonstatisti-
cal representatives of a subset of institutions of higher education
whose small share of total enrollments belies their national signifi-
cance. The three universities are among a relatively few private re-
search universities that produce a disproportionate share of the
country's scholarly research and train a disproportionate share of
the world's scholars. Adding to these universities the equally small
number of elite private liberal arts colleges, of which Carleton is one,
these institutions also provide undergraduate education to a strikingly
large share of the nation's leaders of all fields. Without minimizing
the accomplishments of other private institutions or the giant public
sector in higher education, one must conclude that the social and
economic impact that these elite private institutions exert makes
them well worth studying.
In some respects, these institutions are decidedly unrepresentative
of American higher education. They enroll only a small fraction of
the nation's undergraduates.
3 Their tuitions are far above the aver-
age. In 1991/92, the median amount that the 32 COFHE colleges
and universities charged for tuition, fees, room, and board was
$21,876, more than half again higher than the average for all pri-
vate institutions in that year ($13,983) (U.S. Department of Educa-
tion 1992, p. 308). Their students, both undergraduate and gradu-
ate, were among the best in the country. The faculty of the
universities in this group evince loyalty to their disciplines, as well as
to their institutions, attending more national and international meet-
ings and publishing far more than the average faculty member. One
visible corollary of the research orientation of the universities in the
sample is the high ratio of arts and sciences graduate students to
undergraduates, suggesting the great degree of complementarity of
research and graduate training. In their internal governance, these
institutions tend to give a more substantial role to their faculty, and
sometimes to their students, than is the case in less prestigious col-
leges and universities.
But, as is so often the case when one looks closely at real examplesTHE STUDY AND ITS LIMITATIONS 249
within any category, the four institutions exhibited remarkable vari-
ety, with observable differences in the way that activities were orga-
nized and carried out. Perhaps the most striking contrast in the pres-
ent sample is in the methods used in undergraduate classroom
instruction. The same introductory course that is taught by a pro-
fessor to a class of 30 at one institution might be taught in a large
lecture, with smaller sections led by graduate students meeting once
a week, at another. At a third institution, the same course might be
taught by a graduate student in its entirety. The best single predictor
of the format used in undergraduate instruction appears to be the
ratio of doctoral students to undergraduates; the greater the num-
ber of graduate students, the smaller the share of the faculty's atten-
tion that the undergraduate students will receive. Yet despite the
substantial differences in format and in the amount of faculty atten-
tion given to undergraduates, remarkably, all the institutions vied
for virtually the same students, and the bachelor's degrees offered
by all of them generally were treated as close substitutes by em-
ployers and graduate schools alike.
A second difference that is evident (largely between the liberal arts
college and the research universities) is the sharp contrast in the du-
ties of faculty. Even accounting for some degree of noncom-
parability across institutions, the number of hours that faculty de-
voted to classroom teaching differed sharply, with loads being the
smallest at institutions at which faculty and graduate programs were
rated the highest. Left unmeasured in this study are two activities
that undoubtedly occupy a significant share of the time of faculty at
research universities: research, and the one-on-one teaching that is
an integral part of doctoral training.
The four institutions studied differed in numerous other ways,
although many of the differences amounted to no more than ac-
counting details. A particular function that resided in one depart-
ment at one institution might have been placed elsewhere at an-
other. One institution might have accounted for a given category of
expenditure separately, whereas a second might have lumped it with
other similar items. Missions differ as well, even within a reasonably
consistent definition of arts and sciences; the presence or absence of
museums, university presses, and major intercollegiate athletics pro-
grams illustrates this diversity. Indeed, differences such as these,
and the problems they pose for making comparisons among institu-
tions, are one of the major justifications for using case studies rather
than cross-section financial data.
As a means of overcoming these differences among institutions in
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on changes over time in quantities for given institutions. When ex-
penditures are analyzed, primary attention is paid to internally fi-
nanced expenditures, those funded from unrestricted revenues and
endowment income. When they use internally financed funds—the
most fungible of funds—institutions show their highest level of com-
mitment to the activities so funded. Increases in spending on these
activities have important implications for the continued well-being of
the institutions. But they are not the whole story, of course. Exter-
nally funded spending, even though it does carry earmarked reve-
nues to cover it, may have very real impacts on internally financed
spending—for example, when universities take over funding for ac-
tivities previously supported by outside grants.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
Because this study examines the experiences of only four institu-
tions, strictly speaking, the results are applicable only to those four.
However, it is useful to summarize the patterns that emerge when
viewing all the findings together, for there is good reason to believe
that general trends in this small group will have wider applicability.
Most prominent among the findings—and one that does apply to
other private institutions—is the overall increase in tuition levels and
expenditures. For the entire 15-year period, the mean tuition and
fees at the four institutions increased at a real annual rate of 4.6
percent; for the decade 1981/82 to 1991/92, for which most of the
expenditure data apply, the rate was even higher, 5.3 percent. These
increases apply to the advertised tuition, or sticker price; they over-
state the increase in cost to the average student because financial aid
to students has grown faster still.
4 A notable aspect of the increases
in private tuitions is the breadth with which they covered private
colleges and universities, extending far beyond the relatively small
group of elite institutions. Although tuition and fees increased at an
annual rate of 5.7 percent in the 32 COFHE institutions between
1981/82 and 1991/92, the 4.8 percent average for all private univer-
sities was only one percentage point slower. For all private institu-
tions, the rate was 4.5 percent. The similarity of these rates suggests
that other private institutions were willing and able to follow the
price leadership of the elite ones.
5
Total expenditures for arts and sciences components of the sample
institutions likewise grew rapidly. For the period from the early
1980s to the early 1990s, internally funded expenditures grew at
real annual rates of 5.3 percent at Harvard, 5.7 percent at Carleton,PRINCIPAL FINDINGS 251
6.0 percent at Chicago, and 6.8 percent at Duke. Faculty salaries,
which accounted for a large portion of arts and sciences spending,
grew in real terms, although less rapidly than total spending. Owing
in part to the surprisingly low inflation in the early 1980s, by 1992,
faculty salaries had regained, in real terms, levels that had not been
achieved for two decades. Average faculty salaries rose most rapidly
at Duke, which followed a policy during this period that emphasized
the recruitment of senior scholars from outside the university. In
part, expenditures on faculty also rose because the numbers of fac-
ulty increased at these institutions. The categories of compensation
showing the highest growth rates, however, were nonregular faculty
and professional staff.
Other than compensation, the types of expenditures experiencing
the most rapid growth were financial aid—a big gainer at all four
institutions—and, at more than one institution, computers and other
capital expenditures. Although not one of the largest items, expen-
ditures for computers grew rapidly in importance, as mainframe
machines waned in significance and personal and minicomputers
gained. These and other capital expenditures, including new con-
struction, building renovations, and large equipment, were an im-
portant item of increase at Harvard. All the research universities
expressed heightened concern over start-up costs, the up-front com-
mitments that became a necessary part of the offers made to scien-
tists and other scholars. Most of this increase in spending can be
attributed to the growth in existing programs, as opposed to the cre-
ation of new programs. Perhaps the most important conclusion that
arises from the scrutiny of spending increases, however, is that a
large portion of increases simply cannot be attributed easily to any
identifiable cause. Such widespread expenditure growth is consistent
with across-the-board commitments to quality improvement and ser-
vice enhancements. New services were offered to students, inter-
disciplinary seminars were launched, computer service staffs were
upgraded, and research support to faculty was increased.
Using data for selected departments in the sample institutions, the
study also examines measures of faculty teaching and characteristics
of classes taught. One general trend over the period of study was a
decrease in measured classroom teaching loads. On the basis of data
for three departments in each of the four institutions over the pe-
riod 1976/77 to 1991/92, the unweighted average classroom teaching
load fell by 12 percent in the representative humanities department,
26 percent in the natural science department, and 28 percent in the
social science department.
6 The decreases occurred principally in
undergraduate teaching, with some departments showing increases252 AMBITION MEETS OPPORTUNITY
in graduate teaching. These declines in classroom teaching loads go
hand in hand with the increases observed in the size of the arts and
sciences faculty at the institutions. Moreover, this growth definitely
contributed to higher spending, although, as the calculations in
chapter 5 show, it explains only a small part of the overall increase.
No consistent trend was observed in the average size of classes in the
sample departments, at either the undergraduate or graduate level.
At the undergraduate level, the average size tended to increase in
years of high enrollments. At the same time, in more than half the
sample departments, the percentage of undergraduates enrolled in
seminar-size classes increased through the period. Finally, in appar-
ent reflection of the decline in faculty classroom teaching loads, the
percentage of undergraduates who were taught in class by regular-
rank faculty tended to fall.
WHY DID EXPENDITURES RISE?
Certainly the motivating fact of the present study is the impressive
increase in spending by the nation's leading private research univer-
sities, an increase that was mirrored in tuition rates and matched in
percentage terms by spending increases among other private institu-
tions. At the outset of the study, the possible explanations for any
increase in spending were divided into three generic reasons: (1) an
increase in the cost of purchased inputs, (2) an expansion in the level
or quality of activities being performed, and (3) an increase in ineffi-
ciency. On the basis of the evidence presented here, it is safe to as-
cribe spending increases in the four sample institutions to the first
two explanations. Prices of inputs, most importantly labor inputs,
increased in real terms over the period of study, although this in-
crease may well be seen largely as making up for real declines occur-
ring during the 1970s. The cost of providing other services, such as
campus security and compliance with regulations, also appeared to
rise. Based on the decomposition presented in chapter 5, one-fifth
or less of the increase can be ascribed to increases in the market
price of faculty and other purchased inputs. Spending also increased
because institutions did more things, or attempted to do them better.
Although new activities rarely showed up as new departments, exist-
ing entities took on new activities and expanded old ones. As for the
third explanation, the study found little evidence that increasing in-
efficiency played an important role in the growth in spending, unless
the drop in classroom teaching is prima facie evidence for such inef-
ficiency. This view seems unreasonable, however, because it wouldWHY DID EXPENDITURES RISE? 253
imply that research has little or no value. This is not to say that
inefficiency was absent, but only that it did not grow so as to contrib-
ute importantly to the overall increase in expenditures.
In summarizing the sources of higher spending, it is useful to look
beyond these broad categories of explanation to name in particular
the major influences motivating the growth in spending. I believe
four major causes deserve attention. The first two are more or less
inherent characteristics of the institutions and cannot by themselves
explain why spending would have increased during one period but
not during any other. In contrast, the remaining causes are rather
specific as to time, perhaps representing the spark that ignited a
combustible collection of ready conditions.
Unbounded Aspirations
The first basic cause, or precondition, is the nature of the university
as an organization. Featuring weak central control, a remarkable de-
gree of freedom accorded to its faculty, and traditions of collegiality
in governance, the university lacks any corporate goal other than the
pursuit of excellence. When it comes to the research that it under-
takes, the university has little to guide it other than an uncom-
promising devotion to the highest standards of inquiry. Limits do
exist and compromises must be made, of course, but the official poli-
cies of any university provide few guideposts for making these com-
promises. Furthermore, administrators face a decidedly uneven set
of incentives when considering the possibility of eliminating or
downsizing any program that they oversee. In the same way it has
been observed that, once established, government programs are dif-
ficult to eliminate, owing to the intense interest among the benefici-
aries (and providers) in their continuation, so it appears to be for
programs within universities. Moreover, the university's aim of ex-
cellence contains little that can be used to justify cuts in the same
way a profit objective can be used to guide such decisions in corpo-
rations. This is not to say that universities never eliminate pro-
grams, of course, but only that the forces militating against cuts
are powerful.
7
This institutional imperative for excellence might also apply to ac-
tivities other than research, but if so, certainly to a lesser extent.
During the period of study, the universities appeared to have in-
creasingly emphasized research at the expense of teaching. One
piece of supporting evidence is the decline in average classroom
teaching loads observed in the sample departments. Rosovsky's254 AMBITION MEETS OPPORTUNITY
plaintive observation in 1992 about Harvard was that these shifts
simply occurred, with no official sanction. By all appearances, the
reduction in classroom teaching loads was a widespread phenome-
non. These reduced loads became part of the expectations of faculty
in the same way that salary rates for scholars by field and reputation
became established, through the national labor market for faculty.
The reasons for the increased emphasis on research and for the ac-
companying changes in the expectations of faculty are not obvious,
but the mechanism by which their effects were distributed to cam-
puses across the country was the national market for faculty, which
is one of the important dimensions of competition among institu-
tions.
The Nature of Competition
A second precondition necessary for understanding the increase in
spending is the nature of the competition that exists among institu-
tions. For the private institutions that are the subject of this study,
competition exists at two levels among two overlapping sets of insti-
tutions. First is the competition for students, which takes place
largely among a group of prestigious public and private colleges and
universities. The second arena of competition, and here it is con-
fined largely to research universities and other research organiza-
tions, is for faculty. In both of these dimensions there exists active
and continuous competition among institutions. Some information
in the relevant markets, on such characteristics as tuitions, admis-
sions success, and faculty salaries, was readily available, if not per-
fectly known. Institutions were both aware of what their competitors
were doing and willing to adjust their behavior accordingly. At the
same time, other information, especially indications of quality that
would be helpful to consumers, was virtually nonexistent.
In the market for students, especially that for undergraduates,
two features seem especially noteworthy. The first relates to the na-
ture of the commodity, this amorphous thing called a college educa-
tion. Because it'is little understood and even less perfectly measured,
suppliers have abundant opportunities to provide signals to potential
consumers about the quality of their services. In addition to tangible
indicators, such as buildings, prominent alumni, and published pro-
fessors, one possible indicator is price itself. Indeed, evidence indi-
cates that institutions did not necessarily view tuition increases as
harmful to their attractiveness, so long as their tuition did not depart
from those of the pack of competing colleges. The other, comple-WHY DID EXPENDITURES RISE? 255
mentary aspect of competition in the market for students was an
effective compact on financial aid to which all suppliers subscribed.
Virtually all the colleges and universities that competed with the
sample institutions for the nation's top high school graduates had
pledged to provide need-based financial assistance according to a
fairly uniform formula. Each would offer applicants a package of
loans, employment, and grants equal to the difference between the
student's theoretical ability to pay and the total cost of attendance.
8
Consequently, tuition increases largely would be cushioned,
9 easing
concerns that rising tuition would close the college's doors to low-
income applicants. Together, these two features of the competitive
environment made it feasible for institutions to finance their ambi-
tious goals by increasing tuition, subject only to the strength of the
market's demand and the behavior of their competitors.
The second major dimension of competition among these colleges
and universities covers the several arenas related to faculty and re-
search, the most important of which is the market for faculty. Owing
to their strong disciplinary orientation and a degree of specialization
that limits the number of professors in a subfield who can find work
in any given local labor market, the market for research faculty is
decidedly national in scope, if not international. Most of the profes-
sional expertise that a scholar builds up over the course of a career is
easily portable from one institution to another. Accordingly, institu-
tions that aspire to excellence in research must, within limits, meet
the prevailing standards for salary and conditions of work to hire
and retain faculty.
1
0 The significance of this aspect of competition is
in the interpretation of rising faculty salaries as a factor contributing
to rising costs: because the market is competitive in the sense de-
scribed, individual institutions had little choice but to meet the going
price and conditions of work. Only when an institution chose to up-
grade the quality of its faculty, as Duke did during the study period,
can a portion of the increasing cost of faculty be laid to a deliberate
policy to modify the quality of its purchased inputs. In contrast, in-
creased spending to finance lower classroom teaching loads or
higher start-up costs that merely meet the market might be viewed
more appropriately as increases in the cost of inputs.
A Surge in Demand
The conditions described under the first two headings might never
have been given the chance to contribute to a rise in spending were
it not for a push from a force outside higher education. That push256 AMBITION MEETS OPPORTUNITY
came principally from a surge in the demand for the kind of high-
quality undergraduate training that the most selective colleges and
universities offered. Whether caused by the dramatic increase in
the economic payoff to college, the rapidly advancing affluence of
the affluent, or merely the snob appeal of purchasing a conspicu-
ously expensive service, the premium on acceptance at one of the
nation's most selective colleges appeared to grow during the
1980s. Applications to Ivy League and other selective institutions
rose steadily at the same time that their enrollments remained vir-
tually constant.
In almost any other unregulated market, an increase in demand
against a fixed supply is sure to push up the equilibrium price. It is a
distinctive feature of the market for higher education, however, that
the supplying firms made it a practice not to charge what the market
might bear, choosing instead to ration demand by electing talented
and diverse student bodies who would best fit their institutional ob-
jectives.
1
1 At the same time, however, the trustees and administrators
of these favored institutions could not fail to observe that their ad-
missions offices were being besieged by eager applicants, and that an
unusually large tuition increase would not cool the ardor of prospec-
tive students. And, tuition increases would be safer still if competing
institutions were to increase their tuitions by comparable amounts.
Indeed, to be left behind when all of one's competitors were an-
nouncing healthy increases in tuition might invite the suspicion
among imperfectly informed consumers that the quality of one's
product lagged behind those of its rivals. Thus, the strong demand
from consumers enabled the selective institutions—as a group—to
increase tuitions faster than the rate of inflation. Individual colleges
and universities, for which such actions would be suicide if pursued
alone, were protected from adverse consequences in their admis-
sions by staying safely within the pack.
From their perspective, colleges and universities were not hiking
tuition as a simple reaction to the strong demand. Rather, these ex-
traordinary increases meant extra revenue to finance priority items,
items that stood at the top of long lists on the desk of every provost
and president, items that would serve their institutions' lofty aims
for excellence. The opportunity for extra revenue was a rare chance
to enhance the quality of a few departments by hiring a handful of
nationally known scholars, or to compete more successfully for the
best graduate students by increasing stipends, or to upgrade the
quality of services provided to undergraduate students. One specific
area of opportunity lay in attracting renowned faculty from the pub-
lic research universities, the financial stringencies of which limitedWHY DID EXPENDITURES RISE? 257
their ability to match the high salaries that some top scholars were
being offered. During the 15-year period covered by this study, the
average earnings advantage of faculty in private universities over
those in public universities more than doubled.
1
2 During the 1980s,
then, the ever-present urge for improvement met an opportunity to
make some of that possible. In short, the surge in demand served as
a catalyst, activating the pent-up institutional imperative for excel-
lence.
Uncontrollables
The fourth cause for the rise in spending is a grab bag of contribut-
ing factors over which colleges and universities, even when taken
together, could exert little control. Perhaps the most important of
these was the worldwide increase in the earnings of highly educated
professionals, of which university faculty are a part. The real earn-
ings of doctors, lawyers, and business executives rose significantly
during the 1980s. Those of university faculty rose as well, although
at a somewhat slower rate. Although the job offers made by colleges
and universities, taken together, had some effect on the rate of in-
crease in faculty salaries—spurred in part by the demand for college
training discussed above—these rising salary levels were largely ex-
ogenous, reflecting economy-wide shifts in the value of technical and
professional training.
1
3 As purchasers of labor services in a competi-
tive labor market, then, colleges and universities had little choice but
to pay the market price.
A different type of uncontrollable influence was the technological
revolution that manifested itself in the thousands of personal com-
puters that seemed to materialize overnight throughout universities.
As in virtually every industry in the economy, administrators in
higher education found that computers appeared on purchase or-
ders and desks in every department. These new machines enabled
some economies to be realized, but their initial impact simply was to
increase costs and improve productivity. Not only were the machines
themselves expensive, the dizzying rate at which improved models
were produced made it necessary to replace machines at a rapid
rate. Most important, the introduction of this technology made it
imperative to hire or train a new cadre of professionals to ensure
that ordinary employees could make use of the machines on their
desks. The net effect on costs of this technological onslaught is ex-
ceedingly difficult to distill, combined as it was with undeniable ad-
vances in productivity and improvements in service quality. Further-258 AMBITION MEETS OPPORTUNITY
more, it appears likely that the full impact of computers on
university costs—like that on costs in other industries—cannot yet
be fully assessed. It is possible that larger cost savings may be real-
ized from the reconfiguration and reduction in administrative
staffs.
A third uncontrollable element, largely unique to higher educa-
tion, arose from the changing role of the federal government in its
support of higher education. Although the aggregate dollars of fed-
eral expenditures for research, student financial aid, and other pro-
grams involving payments to institutions kept pace with inflation,
some aspects of that support necessitated increased spending by col-
leges and universities. In the area of student financial aid, limitations
in programs offering grants and the substitution of increasing
amounts of loan moneys left the expensive private institutions with
the responsibility of paying, out of their own internal funds, for vir-
tually all the incremental costs in the need-based financial aid sys-
tem. In the area of sponsored research, federal funding agencies
increasingly tended to require institutions to share the cost of equip-
ment and other direct costs of research. On top of these trends were
layered real increases in the compliance cost of federal regulations,
from the accounting requirements concerning indirect costs em-
bodied in the continuously evolving rules for the calculation of
indirect costs to regulations on handicap-access and drug-free
workplaces. Some of these costs were evident in the growth in of-
fices of sponsored programs at the sample institutions. Others no
doubt were buried in numerous administrative budgets. The over-
all magnitude of these practices and regulations is difficult to as-
sess.
ISSUES FOR THE NEXT 15 YEARS
The 15-year period between 1976/77 and 1991/92 was one of rapid
growth in spending in the nation's leading private research univer-
sities. As Shapiro (1993, p. 15) wryly noted, there has to be some
limit to the portion of national income taken up by the amount spent
on higher education. Assuming this to be the case, that a continua-
tion of past rates of real expenditure increases will not be sustain-
able, how will colleges and universities slow the growth in spending?
The last section of this chapter examines three issues that seem likely
to be central in determining how a new stringency will affect the
operation of colleges and universities, with particular attention given
to the private research universities.ISSUES FOR THE NEXT 15 YEARS 259
The Arrangements for Work
Central to the cost structure of research universities are the everyday
modes of getting work done, the methods of accomplishing ordinary
tasks, the traditions of assigning work, and the customs followed in
distributing responsibilities. The visible manifestations include such
mundane matters as who types manuscripts, how telephones are an-
swered, how classroom teaching assignments are made, who advises
undergraduates about academic matters, and how administrative of-
fices are organized. Arrangements concerning the amount and na-
ture of teaching also are relevant. The substantial freedom tradi-
tionally enjoyed by faculty—over topics for study, methods of
teaching, hours of work, and outside activities—is believed to be vital
to effective production of the creative work demanded of them, and
with justification. This freedom is especially valued at the research
universities, such as those examined in the present study. As
Rosovsky and Bok have pointed out with eloquence,
1
4 however, it is
possible for the social contract under which faculty operate to be
stretched too far. These observers have cited as areas of concern
unsanctioned declines in teaching loads and excessive consulting.
Because of tenure, it is impossible to consider the mechanisms con-
ventionally employed in the corporate world for enforcing compli-
ance with specific organizational guidelines. And, now that manda-
tory retirement is a thing of the past, the issue of faculty productivity
will become all the more important.
How universities deal with these challenges largely will determine
their success in reducing costs. Partly out of a reluctance to tread on
the traditional prerogatives of faculty and partly from a belief that
such methods as total quality management and process re-engineer-
ing simply do not transfer easily to teaching and research, manage-
ment remedies now in vogue have been applied in universities al-
most exclusively in administrative units.
1
5 In those administrative
areas, it seems reasonable to expect that work processes will be trans-
formed gradually so as to adapt to the capacities of computers and
other equipment. But there is no reason to believe that productivity
increases cannot also be achieved in the traditional domain of faculty
work processes. Nor does it seem obvious that such improvements
must necessarily do violence to the freedom that has been a charac-
teristic of faculty work, or of the institution of tenure. Whatever else
happens, the change in retirement rules may well necessitate regular
evaluations of tenured faculty less perfunctory than has been the
norm. In the end, the traditions of independence and collegiality,260 AMBITION MEETS OPPORTUNITY
which often seem to be quaint anachronisms, may turn out to offer
exactly the kind of environment most amenable to the redesign of
work processes.
The 15 years covered by this study already witnessed changes in
the ordinary work arrangements for faculty. Although faculty have
been relieved of a part of their traditional tasks, including a portion
of academic advising and some administrative tasks, it is the ironic
fact that they have assumed some of the clerical duties previously
performed by secretaries, such as answering their telephones and
doing more of their own typing, simply because the new technology
increases the efficiency of this arrangement. Techniques of class-
room teaching appear to be the most resistant to the incorporation
of new technology, but evidence of change is here, too. Taken as a
whole, electronic innovations probably will serve to exacerbate the
outward-looking nature of university faculty. It is hard to anticipate
any other result when a professor finds it easier to send a message to
a colleague a continent away via electronic mail than to go down-
stairs to chat with a fellow department member. An increase in na-
tional and international exchange of ideas seems a likely result of
these advances. More uncertain is whether "distance learning"
through electronic communication will become a standard technique
of education at universities.
The Teaching-Research Trade-off
The second issue that inevitably will persist as universities cope with
cost pressures in the next decade and a half is the tension between
research and undergraduate teaching. Unlike the issue of produc-
tivity, which is essentially independent of an institution's purposes,
the teaching-research trade-off involves both matters of efficiency
and matters of mission. Because both research and teaching are ba-
sic activities for which universities are known, their relevance to mis-
sion is obvious. In considering this trade-off, it is useful to consider
these two aspects separately.
From the standpoint of efficiency, the question is whether there
really is a trade-off at all. It is the oft-repeated mantra of deans and
provosts in research universities that good research makes for good
teaching, or, in the words of economics, that the two activities are
complementary. The professor who has an active research program,
it is argued, can offer students fresh insights and the sense of active
inquiry. Granting that there is truth to this argument, and leaving
open the possibility of future improvements in efficiency that mayISSUES FOR THE NEXT 15 YEARS 261
make it possible to improve teaching and research at the same time,
it seems self-evident that the complementarities between under-
graduate teaching and research can only go so far. Once they are
exhausted, a trade-off between these two activities must be made: at
some point, it becomes possible to increase one only at the expense
of the other. In contrast to graduate instruction, which often is car-
ried out in conjunction with research, undergraduate teaching nec-
essarily takes up time that cannot be used for research, and vice-
versa. It seems safe to assume that, to the extent that their faculty is
being engaged efficiently, research universities now operate in that
range in which the two activities are in fact rivals. The trade-off is
real.
A choice remains, of course, and this is the aspect of the trade-off
that is relevant to institutional mission. During the past 15 years, a
period of increasing emphasis on research, it has been observed that
undergraduates and faculty were content with a "tacit bargain" by
which both sides agreed to limit their demands on the other.
1
6 The
descriptive measures of undergraduate course characteristics pre-
sented in chapter 8 also provide scattered evidence consistent with a
view that undergraduate education may have suffered. The question
for the research universities is whether they will maintain the cur-
rent relative emphasis between research and undergraduate teach-
ing. Judging from the interest that prospective students have shown
in attending, there seems little reason to think that the private re-
search universities will come under much market pressure to give
more attention to undergraduate teaching. But, should demand
slacken, the teaching-research trade-off may well be an issue that
commands the increasing attention of administrators.
Comprehensiveness
The third issue likely to arise as universities consider ways to cope
with rising costs is whether they can afford to continue to be "full-
service" institutions, offering degrees, conducting research in all or
virtually all of the recognized academic fields, and performing many
other services as well. To use one of the sample institutions as an
illustration of the panoply of a university's functions, in 1992, the
University of Chicago offered graduate degrees in 74 fields and un-
dergraduate majors in 51; it operated a massive medical center, four
world-famous science research facilities, an observatory, the editorial
offices of numerous scholarly journals, a university press, four mu-
seums, a library with more than 6 million volumes spread over nu-262 AMBITION MEETS OPPORTUNITY
merous buildings, a laboratory school for elementary and secondary
students, an intercollegiate athletics program fielding varsity teams
in 20 sports, a bus service, a travel agency, a news agency, a printing
department, numerous dormitories and dining halls, and the largest
private police force in Illinois.
1
7 In addition to offering degree pro-
grams to graduate, professional, and undergraduate students, re-
search universities routinely undertake research supported by gov-
ernment agencies, corporations, and foundations; offer executive
training to business professionals, government officials, and founda-
tion executives; and provide continuing education classes to adults.
More than one observer of research universities has suggested that
a range of activities this broad is problematic. Gray (1992, p. 236),
who presided over the activities enumerated in the preceding para-
graph, has argued that this comprehensiveness represents the most
serious problem of research universities, that they are "burdened by
too many tasks, too many demands, and too great a confusion of
expectations." In her opinion, a major cause is the competition
among institutions that, as we have seen, involves matching quality
for quality. In his essay two decades before, Coleman (1973) ad-
vanced a similar theme, suggesting that some of the functions car-
ried out by universities must be partitioned or jettisoned. In particu-
lar, Coleman argues that undergraduate education is ultimately
incompatible with the research and graduate training functions and
ought to be separated, which responds of course to the tension be-
tween research and teaching discussed above and is in effect accom-
plished in liberal arts colleges.
1
8 Regardless of whether these func-
tions are compatible, the broad scope of the enterprise as a whole
certainly has cost implications, as Gray and others have stressed. In
his plan for reducing expenditures at Duke, for example, Kenneth
Pye argued forcefully for selective retrenchment rather than across-
the-board cuts. One approach is simply to learn to "do without."
Where resources can be shared among institutions, however, this de-
gree of stringency may not be entirely necessary. One can find nu-
merous examples of neighboring institutions that share computing
facilities, coordinate library acquisitions, and even allow cross-regis-
tration for courses. Such sharing has long been institutionalized in
interlibrary loan. With the advent of widespread access to electronic
communication, this kind of cooperation should become significantly
easier to accomplish.
Ultimately, the degree to which comprehensiveness will be re-
stricted largely will be like the extent to which expenditure growth
will be restrained, a function of the growth in revenues. As has been
the case in the past, revenues will largely determine the growth inISSUES FOR THE NEXT 15 YEARS 263
spending. As long as universities hold the high aspirations that have
characterized them in the past, the imperative for excellence will
place pressure on spending. Only when revenue growth slows will
spending growth slow. As to that possibility, it does indeed seem
likely that the major sources of university funding will grow more
slowly during the next 15 years. Although periods of scarcity have
been forecast before but have not materialized, all indications now
seem to point to a tightening of constraints. If every challenge
presents an opportunity, then these institutions have an oppor-
tunity to employ new technologies and techniques to improve the
manner in which they accomplish the traditional aims of the re-
search university.